HMS Harpy was an 18 gun Brig-sloop of the Diligence Class, built under Navy Board contract by Thomas King at his shipyard on Beach Street, Dover.
Designed jointly by the Surveyors of the Navy at the time, Sir John Henslow and Sir William Rule, the Diligence Class was a group of eight brig-rigged Sloops-of-War, of which four were built in Kent shipyards. HMS Harpy was one of three vessels of the class to be built from oak rather than fir and for this reason, she had the longest career of any vessel in the class. The other oak-built vessels were HMS Diligence and HMS Hound. The other kent-built vessels were HMS Seagull and HMS Kangaroo, both built by John and William Wells at their Deptford shipyard and HMS Hound, built by Robert Hill in Sandwich.
In common with most British Brig-sloops of the period, the Diligence Class were flush-decked; that is that their guns were carried on the main deck, out in the open, rather than on an enclosed gun-deck. Their brig-rig (with two, rather than three masts) and carronade armament meant that they only required small crews, which was a god-send for the Royal Navy which at the time was desperately short of men despite the efforts of the Impressment Service. Their armament of carronades gave them a ferocious short-range broadside. In fact, the weight of broadside they could fire was slightly heavier than that of the nominal armament of an 18 pdr armed 36 gun Frigate. All that firepower was delivered on a hull half the size of the Frigate and manned only a third of the crew. The downside to this was that their brig rig only having two masts, made them more vulnerable to being crippled by damage to masts, spars and rigging. In addition, the short range of their carronades made them vulnerable to being picked off at range by the long guns fitted to enemy frigates. The term Sloop-of-War was used to classify a general-purpose, ocean-going warship which carried less than the 20 guns required for the vessel to be rated under the Royal Navy's rating system.
Sloops of War tended to have a "Master and Commander", abbreviated to "Commander", appointed in command rather than an officer with the rank of Captain. At the time, the rank of Commander did not exist as it does today. It was a position rather than a formal rank and an officer commanding a Sloop of War had a substantive rank of Lieutenant and was appointed as her Master and Commander. An officer in the post of Master and Commander would be paid substantially more than a Lieutenant's wages and would also receive the lions share of any prize or head money earned by the ship and her crew. If a war ended and the Sloop's commanding officer was laid off, he would receive half-pay based on his substantive rank of Lieutenant. If he was successful or competent, he would usually be promoted to Captain or "Posted" either while still in command of the sloop, or would be promoted and appointed as a Captain on another, rated ship. Sloops of War therefore tended to be commanded by ambitious young men anxious to prove themselves.
The contract for the construction of HMS Harpy was signed between the Navy Board and Thomas King on 18th March 1795. As per the usual practice, the letter enclosing the contracts, specifications and drafts was delivered to Thomas King's offices by courier from the Navy Board in London. Once the moulds had been made in the Mould Loft and the first timbers cut for the keel, the first section was laid in May of 1795 and the vessel was launched with all due ceremony into Dover Harbour nine months later with her hull fully complete, having cost £3,683. After her launch, HMS Harpy was taken to the Royal Dockyard at Deptford, arriving on 22nd February 1796, where she was fitted with her masts, guns and rigging. She commissioned at Deptford on 4th April 1796, with Mr Henry Bazely appointed as her Master and Commander. When declared complete on 7th May 1796, fitting the vessel out had cost a further £3,167.
On completion, HMS Harpy was a vessel of 316 tons. She was 95ft long on her main deck and 75ft 1in long at her keel. She was 28ft 1in wide across her beam and her hold was 12ft deep. She was armed with 16 x 32pdr carronades on her broadside and 2 x 6pdr long guns in her bows. In addition to these, she was fitted with a dozen half-pounder swivel guns attached to her bulwarks and in her fighting tops. If you look at the Sheer Plan and Lines below, you will see a small square port beside each gunport. This was for a sweep, or a large oar. These were used as a last resort to manoeuvre the vessel out of a harbour in adverse winds or to give steerage way if she was becalmed. You will also see a pair of empty gunports over the stern. In a chase, or in action, these could be filled with either the 6pdr long guns or carronades, depending on the situation. HMS Harpy was manned by a crew of 121 officers, men and boys.
Diligence Class PlansInboard profile, main and lower deck plans:
Framing Plan:
Sheer Plan and Lines:
HMS Harpy was Mr Bazeley's first command appointment and he was ordered to take her to join the Downs Squadron, patrolling the stretch of water where the North Sea joins the English Channel. His appointment in HMS Harpy and being assigned to the Downs Squadron was no coincidence. His father, John Bazely was a Rear-Admiral and commanded the Squadron.
On Christmas Day 1796, HMS Harpy was in company with the hired armed cutter Hind when they captured the ship Hoop. On 3rd February off Dungeness, HMS Harpy came across the hired armed cutter Lion which was in the process of capturing the French privateer sloop Requin out of Dieppe with 20 men armed with muskets. Intelligence gained from the crew of the Requin led them in chase of a prize recently taken by the Requin, the Newcastle which HMS Harpy caught and captured off Beachy Head the following day. Both vessels were taken into Portsmouth before HMS Harpy returned to her station in the Downs.
The year 1797 started profitably enough for the men of HMS Harpy. In February they captured the French privateer La Cotentin, for which they received prize-money based on the sale of that vessel and the stores and equipment she was carrying when captured. On 8th May, she captured the Russian Hoy Leyden and Forecoing while operating in company with the 18pdr armed 40 gun frigate HMS Beaulieu and the 6pdr armed 14 gun ship sloop HMS Savage and was entitled to a share of the prize-money for that vessel. On 16th May, she captured the Dutch vessel Goede Hope while operating in company with the hired armed cutter Princess of Wales. Ten days later, the cargo vessel Friendship was recaptured.
By the spring of 1798, intelligence had reached the British that a large number of transport schyuts had been prepared at Flushing in order to mount the long-threatened French invasion of Britain. These vessels were to be transported down the Bruges Canal to Ostende and thence to Dunkerque. To prevent this, the Admiralty ordered a large-scale raid to be carried out on Ostende, which was to be led by Major-General Eyre Coote. The Naval element was to be commanded by Commodore Home Riggs Popham in the former 44 gun two-decker, now converted to a troopship, HMS Expedition. HMS Harpy was ordered to join Popham's force which was assembling in the Margate Roads, off Margate in Kent. In addition to HMS Expedition and HMS Harpy, the force also comprised HMS Pallas (Troopship, formerly the 18pdr-armed 38-gun Frigate HMS Minerva - 20 guns), the brig-sloops HMS Kite of 18 guns and HMS Wolverine of 14 guns, the gun-brigs HMS Acute, HMS Biter, HMS Blazer, HMS Cracker, all of 14 guns, the gun-brigs HMS Asp and HMS Furnace of 12 guns each, the bomb vessels HMS Hecla and HMS Tartarus and the hired armed cutter Dart of 8 guns. The landing force was to comprise of four light infantry companies of the Grenadier Guards aboard HMS Pallas under Lieutenant-Colonel Ward, with the remainder of the troops under the Major-General, comprising two light infantry companies of the Coldstream Guards, two light infantry companies of the 11th foot regiment, a company each from the 23rd and 49th foot regiments, together with a small party of miners. The total landing force consisted of 1140 men and had six field guns. The fleet departed the Margate Road on 14th May but because of adverse winds, did not arrive off Ostende until about 01:00 on 19th. By this time, the wind had shifted and had kicked up a heavy surf at their intended landing point. Receiving intelligence from a merchant vessel unfortunate enough to encounter Commodore Popham's force that their target was only lightly defended, it was decided to land the force there and then and hope that the weather would have improved by the time they needed to re-embark. By 03:00, the landings were completed without opposition. At about 04:15, shore batteries opened fire on the nearest British vessels, HMS Wolverine, HMS Asp and HMS Biter. A heavy exchange of fire lasting about four hours then followed in which HMS Wolverine and HMS Asp in particular were badly damaged. While this was going on, the Bomb Vessels were launching their shells into the town and basin at Ostende, doing considerable damage to the town and vessels in the basin. Seeing the damage being sustained by HMS Wolverine and HMS Asp, Commodore Popham ordered them to withdraw and their places be taken by HMS Dart, HMS Kite and HMS Harpy, which continued the bombardment of the shore batteries. Because of the low state of the tide and the fact that the replacement vessels were somewhat bigger, they were obliged to anchor further offshore and as a result, their fire was less effective than before.
At 10:20, the landing force blew up the locks and sluice gates of the Bruges Canal, with the explosions so large they could be seen and heard from the ships waiting off the shore. By noon, they were ready to re-embark, but such was the weather, this was not possible. The troops then took up defensive positions in the sand dunes and waited for the weather to calm down. They waited for the rest of the day and all the following night, but daybreak on 20th May saw them attacked by a French force of considerable strength. In the action which followed, the landing force took casualties of 65 men killed and wounded before they were forced to negotiate terms of surrender with the French.
By 1800, HMS Harpy had been redeployed to the Channel Fleet and in the early morning of 5th February 1800, was laying at anchor in St Aubyn's Bay, Jersey in company with the 6pdr armed 16 gun Ship-sloop HMS Fairy. The previous day, the 16-gun 4pdr armed Topsail Cutter HMS Seaflower had been chased by a French Frigate, identified as the 18pdr armed 38 gun Frigate La Pallas. After breaking off the chase, the Pallas was seen to put into St Malo. At about 6am, the two British sloops weighed anchor and headed to St Malo, their intentions being to see if the Pallas was still there. At about 11:30, the two British sloops sighted a large ship running along the shore towards Brest, which was quickly identified as being their target. Commander Horton of HMS Fairy as the senior officer, decided to bring the Pallas to action, calculating that between them and especially with HMS Harpy's 32pdr carronades, they should be able to get the better of the large and powerful French frigate. At about 12:20, seeing that there was no chance of bringing the Pallas to action all the time she was so close to the shore, Commander Horton ordered that they back off and open the range, hoping to entice the Pallas to give chase. The Frenchman took the bait and began to give chase immediately. At 13:00, the fight started, with both British sloops engaging the big French frigate at pistol-shot range, or about 30 yards. HMS Harpy took up a position astern of the Pallas and raked her through the stern a number of times. At about 15:00, the Frenchman broke off the action headed off under all sail to the north-east. After quickly making running repairs to their damaged rigging, HMS Harpy and HMS Fairy gave chase. At about 15:15, the Pallas sighted two ships dead ahead of her. The ships were soon afterwards sighted by the two British vessels. On sighting the strangers, Commander Horton signalled HMS Harpy to try to take up a position upwind of the French frigate. Having guessed that the strangers were friendly, Commander Horton ordered the signal "Enemy in Sight" to be hoisted, repeated by HMS Harpy and both sloops began firing signal guns to draw attention to it. The approaching vessels were soon identified as being the ex-French 18pdr armed 38 gun Frigate HMS Loire, the ex-French 32pdr carronade-armed 20 gun Post-ship HMS Danae and the small ex-French 12pdr carronade-armed 14 gun Ship-sloop HMS Railleur. These vessels had been sent from Plymouth on 27th and 28th January with the express purpose of bringing the Pallas to action and capturing her. Realising he was horribly outgunned, Captain Jacques Epron of the Pallas decided to try to run for Brest, pursued by a pack of no less than five British vessels. By 22:30, HMS Loire had caught up with the Pallas, which had managed to close with the shore and the cover of a shore battery. Undeterred, HMS Loire began a gunnery duel with the Pallas, despite coming under fire from the shore as well. By 23:00, the sloops had caught up. At about 01:30, HMS Harpy assumed a position under the Pallas' stern and fired in a full broadside. The French had had enough and surrendered. In the Capture of the Pallas, HMS Harpy suffered casualties of one seaman killed, and three seamen wounded. The Pallas turned out to be a fine and powerful frigate of 1,029 tons and was purchased into the Royal Navy as HMS Pique.
The Chase and Capture of the Pallas, the opening engagement: HMS Harpy is the two-masted vessel in the foreground with HMS Fairy ahead of her. The Pallas is the enemy vessel towering over them both.
Another, more modern view of the same action by John Bentham-Dinsale. HMS Harpy is the British vessel in the backgound right and HMS Fairy is background left:
On 9th February 1800, HMS Harpy and HMS Fairy both arrived safely in Plymouth. On 18th February, both vessels departed for a patrol off the Biscay coast of France, in company with the 24pdr carronade-armed 18 gun Ship-sloop HMS Dasher. HMS Harpy wasn't at sea for long this time, she arrived back in Plymouth on 3rd March in company with the 12pdr armed 32 gun Frigate HMS Ceres. Shortly after their arrival and as a reward for his actions in the chase and capture of the Pallas, Commander Bazely was posted and was replaced in command of HMS Harpy by Mr William Birchall, formerly Master and Commander in the hired Troopship Hebe.
The rest of the year of 1800 was spent in the typical duties of a sloop-of-war in the Channel Fleet. HMS Harpy and her crew spent their time escorting convoys, running sealed orders to the squadrons of ships of the line and frigates engaged in keeping the French Atlantic Fleet blockaded in their bases and carrying dispatches back to Portsmouth and Plymouth and patrolling the French coast, the Western Approaches, the Bay of Biscay and the English Channel.
On 7th December 1800, HMS Harpy left Portsmouth to escort a massive convoy of 317 merchant ships. On clearing the English Channel, the convoy was to split up with the ships going to the Mediterranean, Lisbon and Opporto. The other vessels in the escort force were the 44 gun two-deckers HMS Chichester and HMS Serapis, the ex-French 18pdr armed Frigate HMS Pique, the 18pdr armed 36 gun frigate HMS Seahorse and the 12pdr armed 32 gun frigate HMS Maidstone. HMS Harpy's orders were only to escort the convoy out of the English Channel and then return to Portsmouth. By the 10th December, the convoy had been joined by more merchant ships, making a total of 550 ships, plus the storeship HMS Alliance of 14 guns. At dawn that morning, the keepers at the Eddystone Lighthouse were greeted by an awesome sight. The wind had dropped away to a dead calm and the entire horizon around the lighthouse was filled with a forest of masts with ships as far as the eye could see. By noon, the wind had got up again and the convoy took the rest of the day, all night and all the next day to get clear of the lighthouse.
On 9th January 1801, HMS Harpy in company with the Revenue Cutter Greyhound recaptured the hired armed cutter Constitution, which had been captured earlier that day by two large French cutters off Portland.
In early 1800, a sequence of events began which was to indirectly a major action which was to involve HMS Harpy and her crew. It was also to lead, eventually, to the opening of another front in the war. In time of war, the British had always insisted on the right to stop and search neutral ships at sea for contraband and war materials. The Dutch Navy had ceased to be an effective force after the Battle of Camperdown and the Vlieter Incident. As a result of this, Britain's erstwhile ally Russia had joined together with other, neutral northern nations to try to force the British to give up this right. On 25th July 1800, a small British squadron which included the 20 gun ship-sloop HMS Arrow and the 28 gun frigate HMS Nemesis encountered the large 40 gun Danish frigate Freya, which was escorting a convoy of six vessels through the English Channel, near the Goodwin Sands. In accordance with the age-old British tradition of stopping and searching neutral vessels, Captain Thomas Baker of HMS Nemesis hailed the Freya and informed the Danes of his intention to send a boat around each vessel in turn and conduct a brief search. The Danish captain, Captain Krabbe responded to the effect that the Freya would fire on the British boat if they attempted to board any of the vessels under his protection. The British duly put their boat into the water and the Danes duly carried out their threat. In the action which followed, the Freya was forced to surrender after having suffered 2 men killed and five wounded. The Danish convoy was escorted to the great anchorage at The Downs, off Deal and anchored there. In an attempt to diffuse the situation, the Commander-in-Chief at the Downs, Vice-Admiral Skeffington Lutwidge ordered that the Danish vessels be allowed to continue flying their own colours. This incident and another similar incident in the Mediterranean had threatened to open a major rift between Britain and Denmark. It was vitally important for Britain to maintain good relations with neutral Denmark, since the Danes controlled the Kattegat, that narrow passage from the North Sea into the Baltic.
In order to pacify the Danes and to intimidate them in case Plan A, diplomacy, failed, the British sent Lord Whitworth, previously Ambassador to the Imperial Court in Russia and Britains leading diplomat to Copenhagen to negotiate a settlement to the growing dispute before it erupted into an armed conflict. In order to reinforce Lord Whitworth's position, the British sent a squadron comprising nine ships of the line, HMS Monarch (74), HMS Polyphemus (64), HMS Veteran (64) and HMS Ardent (64), HMS Glatton (50), HMS Isis (50), HMS Romney (50) the ex-Dutch ships HMS Waakzamheid (50) and HMS Martin (50), the Bomb Vessels HMS Sulphur, HMS Volcano, HMS Hecla and HMS Zebra and the gun-brigs HMS Swinger, HMS Boxer, HMS Furious, HMS Griper and HMS Haughty. The force was commanded by Vice-Admiral Archibald Dickson, who flew his command flag in HMS Monarch. On 29th August an agreement was reached whereby the British would pay for repairs to the Freya and the other Danish ships, that the right of the British to stop and search neutral vessels at sea would be discussed at another time and that Danish vessels would only sail in convoy in the Mediterranean for protection against Algerine corsairs. With the signing of the agreement, Dickson returned to Yarmouth with his force. That would have been the end of the matter had the pro-British Tzarina of Russia, Catherine II, not fallen ill and died. She was succeeded by her son Paul, who was a fan of Napoleon Bonaparte and was itching to find an excuse to start a war against the British. Tzar Paul took offence at the attack on the Freya and at the presence of a British squadron in the Baltic Sea. He ordered his army and navy to be mobilised for war and ordered that all British property in his dominions be seized. About 3 weeks afterward however, he changed his mind and on 22nd Septemeber, ordered that all seized British property be returned to its owners.
In the meantime, news reached Tzar Paul that the British had refused to hand Malta back to the Knights of St John after having driven the French from the islands back in 1797. This enraged the Tzar who had been promised control of the islands by the French. On 5th November, his order to seize all British shipping in Russian ports was reinstated. In the December, the Tzar proposed a confederation of Armed Neutrality which was to comprise Russia, Sweden and Denmark. If allowed to take form, this would mean the British could potentially face a new, additional opponent possessing a total of over 100 ships of the line as well as the combined fleets of Spain and France. The British decided to meet this new menace in kind and a fleet began to be assembled at Yarmouth, to be led by Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker with Vice-Admiral Sir Horatio, Viscount Nelson of the Nile as his second-in-command. With Parker flying his command flag in the 98 gun Second Rate ship of the line HMS London and with Nelson flying his in the 98 gun Second Rate ship of the line HMS St. George and accompanied by 18 more ships of the line, with 4 Frigates plus Sloops-of-War including HMS Harpy, Bomb Vessels and Gun-Brigs, the fleet departed Yarmouth on 12th March 1801. Parker had orders to neutralise the fortifications at Copenhagen and the Danish fleet should last minute negotiations fail. The plan was that Nelson would lead the attack squadron, comprising of the shallower-draughted and smaller ships of the line, while Parker held back with the bigger ships. Nelson shifted his command flag to the 74 gun ship HMS Elephant.
The Danish fleet consisted of 24 ships of the line, anchored off the fortifications of Copenhagen and Nelson and his force of 12 ships of the line were required to neutralise these before troops could be landed to assault the fortifications. In the morning of the 2nd April 1801, Nelson's force made its way slowly up the Skaw, but suffered losses when first, the 64 gun ship HMS Agamemnon, then the 74 gun ships HMS Bellona and HMS Russell ran aground. Battle was joined at 10:05 when the Danish shore batteries opened fire. For the first half an hour, the leading British ships, HMS Ardent (64), HMS Polyphemus (64), HMS Edgar (74), HMS Isis (50) and HMS Monarch (74) bore the brunt of the fire from the Danish batteries both ashore and afloat. HMS Isis was the most severely damaged and had to be rescued by HMS Polyphemus.
View of the Battle of Copenhagen. HMS Harpy would be one of the supporting vessels at the bottom of the picture:
Another view of the Battle of Copenhagen:
After about 11:30, the rest of Nelson's force, HMS Glatton, HMS Elephant, HMS Ganges (74), HMS Defiance (74) and the frigates joined in the action relieving the pressure. At 16:00, a ceasefire was negotiated. The Danes had suffered heavy losses. The Danish flagship had blown up, killing 250 men. In all, it is estimated that Danish losses were about 1800 men killed, captured or wounded. The British losses came to about 250 men. The Danish fleet had been beaten into submission and the day after the battle, the Danes surrendered.
HMS Harpy was only a spectator to the Battle of Copenhagen, so suffered no casualties or damage. As part of the general sharing out of rewards following the battle, Commander Birchall was posted, the promotion effective from the day of the battle. In May 1801, Captain Birchall was appointed to command HMS Glatton and HMS Harpy was paid off.
HMS Harpy was recomissioned in August 1802 with Mr Edmund Heywood appointed as her Master and Commander. By the time she recommissioned, the French Revolutionary War had been ended by the Treaty of Amiens, signed in the previous March. The peace only lasted just over a year and by the end of May 1803, Britain and France were at war again.
At the end of October 1803, HMS Harpy was operating off Calais and Boulogne in company with the 6pdr armed Ship-sloop HMS Lark of 16 guns, under the orders of Captain Robert Honeyman in the 18pdr armed 38 gun Frigate HMS Leda. At the time, the French had assembled a huge army of some 83,000 men in the area around Boulogne in preparation for an invasion of England and Captain Honeyman's force was engaged in making sure that this army did not have the means to cross the English Channel.
At 09:00 on 31st October, the three vessels were off Etaples near Calais and were working towards the shore against a strong east-south-easterly wind. A large brig mounting 12 x 24pdr long guns was seen coming out of Etaples in company with a number of smaller vessels and Captain Honeyman ordered HMS Lark and HMS Harpy to give chase. Independently of Captain Honeyman's force, the hired armed cutter Admiral Mitchell, carrying a dozen 12pdr carronades, patrolling off Calais, had also sighted the enemy vessels and had also given chase. At 10am, the Admiral Mitchell brought the enemy vessels to action and forced the brig and one of the other vessels to run ashore.
Despite the efforts of Captain Honeyman and his vessels, more and more French vessels began to assemble in the Boulogne Road, immediately off the port and under the cover of powerful shore batteries. On 19th July 1804, in the afternoon, the wind began to rise from the east-north-east and caused such a sea to rise that the masters of the various French vessels anchored in the Boulogne Road began to get uneasy. In order to prevent themselves being wrecked on a lee shore, many of the enemy vessels began to put to sea to either ride out the storm in the open sea, or to make for Etaples, which offered better shelter. Captain Honeyman ordered HMS Harpy and the 18pdr carronade-armed gun brigs HMS Archer and HMS Bloodhound, each of 12 guns, to immediately chase down and attack any vessels leaving the anchorage. At the same time, the 24pdr carronade-armed ship-sloop HMS Autumn of 14 guns operating independently also got stuck in. There is no record of the numbers of French vessels driven ashore after being caught between the guns of the Royal Navy and the weather. It is known however that the bodies of over 400 French soldiers and sailors were washed ashore and the disaster was witnessed by Napoleon himself. He was taught a valuable lesson; that it was not just the Royal Navy he had to fear when trying to get his huge army across the English Channel.
Nevertheless, the preparations for the invasion of Britain continued and by 25th August, some 146 French gun-vessels were laying in the Boulogne Road, 62 of them were Gun-brigs and the rest were mainly Luggers. In order to entertain the Emperor, the French Admiral Bruix decided to order a division of these vessels to weigh anchor and head towards where the British 18pdr carronade Gun-brig HMS Bruiser of 12 guns was laying, keeping an eye on them. At about 13:45, an exchange of fire began between the French Gun-boats and HMS Bruiser, which soon brought the ex-French 18pdr armed 38 gun Frigate HMS Immortalite to the spot and at 14:30 the frigate opened fire on the French too. The French decided to withdraw but the foray had pursuaded the British to keep HMS Immortalite closer to the shore. The following day, the British decided to hit the French force and to that end, HMS Immortalite accompanied by HMS Harpy, the 18pdr carronade armed gun-brig HMS Adder and HMS Constitution made sail towards a force of some 60 gun-brigs and other vessels. The French kept close to the shore in order to tempt the British under the guns of the shore batteries. The temptation was too much to resist for the British and despite the incessant fire from ashore, they closed to within three quarters of a mile from the shore and opened fire on the vast numbers of French vessels arrayed before them. While the Constitution was engaging a heavy gun-brig on one side and two luggers on the other with her 12pdr carronades, she was hit by a 13in shell which passed clean through her without exploding. Unfortunately, the hole in her bottom could not be plugged and the vessel began to sink. HMS Harpy was one of those which sent boats to rescue the crew of the Constitution, who were saved without loss. HMS Harpy was also hit by a shell which killed one of her seamen and lodged in a beam immediately under her main deck. The shell did not explode, it appeared that before lodging in the beam, it passed through the body of the sailor it killed and his blood put the fuse out. Things continued like this until about 28th August, during which time over 20 of the French invasion craft had been destroyed despite being under the protection of powerful shore batteries. Again, Napoleon was taught a hard lesson. In the space of five weeks he had witnessed what the Royal Navy and the weather would do to his invasion fleet and that was before they even got out of their base.
Things continued in this vein for the rest of 1804 and into 1805. On 29th January 1805, HMS Harpy's men cut out a lugger from off Boulogne and sent it back to Deal with HMS Bruiser.
On 24th April 1805, HMS Leda spotted a force of 27 French Schyuts coming around Cap Gris Nes and Captain Homeyman ordered the squadron including HMS Harpy to engage. HMS Fury (12), HMS Harpy, HMS Railleur (14), HMS Bruiser, HMS Gallant (12), HMS Archer (12), HMS Locust (12), HMS Tickler (12), HMS Watchful (12), HMS Monkey (12) and HMS Firm (12), tore into the enemy. After a fight, which occurred close to the enemy shore batteries on Cap Gris Nes, HMS Starling and HMS Locust had captured 8 of the enemy vessels. The next day, HMS Archer brought in two more and Railleur brought in another 8. The rest of the squadron accounted for another ten in addition to an unarmed transport ship.
By May 1805, HMS Harpy had been reassigned back to the Downs Squadron and continued to keep an eye on French preparations for the planned invasion. The invasion itself could not happen until the French had secured the English Channel. In order to achieve this, the French Toulon fleet had to join forces with the Spanish Cadiz fleet and the French Brest Fleet. To this end, the Toulon Fleet under Vice-Admiral Pierre Villeneuve broke out and led the British Mediterranean Fleet under Lord Nelson on a chase around the Mediterranean, across the Atlantic, around the Caribbean and back. The fleet ran into a detachment of the British Channel Fleet under Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Calder and was defeated in the Third Battle of Cape Finisterre. They fled into firstly Ferrol and from there into Cadiz. The combined Spanish and French fleet then put to sea and was defeated by Lord Nelson at the Battle of Trafalgar on 21st October 1805. The Brest Fleet was trapped by the blockade and after the defeat at Trafalgar, the invasion was called off.
In early 1807, HMS Harpy was paid off and went into the Ordinary at Portsmouth. She remained there until April 1809, when she was refitted and then recommissioned under Mr George William Blamey. Between July and December 1809, HMS Harpy was part of a massive fleet deployed by the Royal Navy in support of the Walcheren Campaign, where the British attempted to open up a new front in the War of the Fifth Coalition. A huge army of 40,000 soldiers, 15,000 horses, field artillery and two seige trains were landed at Walcheren in the Netherlands. The campaign lasted until early December. There was little actual fighting but before they withdrew, the army had lost over 4,000 men of whom only 106 were actually killed in action. The rest died from the so-called "Walcheren Fever". The campaign achieved nothing.
On 2nd January 1811, HMS Harpy sailed for the Cape of Good Hope. Once there, she joined a fleet under the command of Rear-Admiral the Honourable Robert Stopford, flying his command flag in HMS Scipion (74). The fleet was tasked with taking Java from the Dutch. The fleet arrived off Java on 3rd August 1811 and once the army under Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Auchmuty had been landed, the colony fell to the British on 16th September.
The rest of the war was quiet for HMS Harpy. The war itself ended in 1814 with the signing of the Treaty of Fontainebleu. By August 1817, HMS Harpy had been laid up at Woolwich and on 19th, the Navy Board ordered that she be sold. On 18th November 1817, the vessel was surveyed and was condemned and was sold for breaking up.
