Author Topic: HMS London (1766 - 1811)  (Read 1702 times)

Offline stuartwaters

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Re: HMS London (1766 - 1811)
« Reply #2 on: September 16, 2020, 06:30:45 PM »
Restored...
"I did not say the French would not come, I said they will not come by sea" - Admiral Sir John Jervis, 1st Earl St Vincent.

Offline stuartwaters

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HMS London (1766 - 1811)
« Reply #1 on: September 20, 2019, 11:19:32 PM »

HMS London was a Second Rate ship of the line built at the Royal Dockyard, Chatham and which was launched in 1766. She was to be the lead ship of a class of four Second Rate ships of the line, although it was to be another twenty years before the other three vessels in the class were built. All four ships of the London Class were built in Kent shipyards. HMS London had been designed by Sir Thomas Slade, Co-Surveyor of the Navy, whose most famous design, the 100 gun First Rate ship of the line HMS Victory, was built at Chatham at the same time as HMS London. The other ships in the London Class, when they were eventually built were:


HMS Impregnable - Built at the Woolwich Royal Dockyard


HMS Windsor Castle - Built at the Deptford Royal Dockyard


HMS Prince - Also built at the Chatham Royal Dockyard.


At the time the ship was built, Second Rate ships were not fitted with guns on their quarterdecks in order to save topweight, hence HMS London was originally designed as a ship of 90 guns.


At the time the ship was ordered, Britain was embroiled in the Seven Years War, which was the first proper world war in the true sense of the phrase. Apart from a hiccup at the Battle of Minorca at the beginning of the war in 1756, the war at sea was going very well for the British and the Royal Navy. The Government of William Pitt had embarked on a strategy of taking the war to the French and their allies by attacking them in their overseas possessions in places as far away as India and the Phillipines as well as around the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. A war on such a scale required a huge expansion in the size of the Royal Navy and a shipbuilding programme of an unprecedented scale was underway throughout the late 1750s and early 1760s. HMS London was ordered as part of this programme.


HMS London was ordered by the Navy Board on Monday 13th December 1758. Her first keel section was laid down on 4th November 1759. Just over two weeks after the first keel section was laid, the Royal Navy won a convincing victory over the French at the Battle of Quiberon Bay. This was only one of a number of spectacular victories won by the British over the French that year. The scale of the defeat at Quiberon Bay was such that the French Navy was unable to prevent the British from taking the richest French possessions in the Caribbean and Canada. The French government were forced default on its debts and to sue for peace. The war was ended by the Treaty of Paris in 1763. With the war over, the construction of a very large ship like HMS London was given a lower priority and the ship wasn't launched into the River Medway until Saturday 24th May 1766.


The construction of HMS London had been overseen by Mr Edward Allin, Master Shipwright at Chatham. With the war for which she had been built over by the time she was launched, the ship was immediately laid up in the Ordinary at Chatham. HMS London spent the next twelve years secured to a buoy in the River Medway under the care of a skeleton crew. This comprised of a Boatswain, Carpenter, Cook and Gunner, all of whom were senior Warrant Officers in the Royal Navy. These men lived aboard the ship with their servants and families. In addition to this, the ship also had a crew of 32 men, all rated as Able Seamen. A further senior Warrant Officer in the form of a Purser was also assigned to the ship, but because his was not a 'sea' trade as such, he was allowed to live ashore. The ship, along with all the ships in the Chatham Ordinary, came under the command of the Master Attendant at Chatham. Construction up to the point of launch had cost £53,036.


London Class Plans


Orlop Plan:





Lower Gundeck Plan:





Middle Gundeck Plan:





Upper Gundeck Plan:





Quarterdeck and Forecastle Plans:





Inboard Profile and Plan:





Sheer Plan and Lines:





If you look carefully at the Inboard Profile and Plan and the Lines, you will see where the plans have been altered in green. These alterations were made to HMS London during her preparations for sea as part of the mobilisation of the fleet in 1778/1779, when her armament was increased from 90 to 98 guns. This was achieved by simply adding four gunports to each side of the quarterdeck. The other ships in the class were built from the outset as 98 gun ships.


A painting of HMS London:





While HMS London was laying at her mooring in the River Medway, the sequence of events which led to the next war began. The Seven Years War had been fought on a previously unseen scale and had left the British Government with a massive pile of debt which needed to be repaid. The end of the war, as with all major wars, had led to a deep economic recession. The same cannot be said of Britain's American Colonies which were enjoying an economic boom. The Government decided to tap into this and imposed a series of taxes on the colonists. This led to a storm of protests, which eventually escalated into an armed rebellion. In 1775 and 1776, the rebels in America won a series of victories against the British. These victories pursuaded the French to begin to supply the rebels with arms and money. With the war going badly, the British prepared to make major concessions, basically giving the colonists everything they wanted. The French, concerned that the Americans would turn against them and attack their own possessions in modern-day Louisiana and Florida, offered a treaty which gave the rebels unlimited military assistance in return for a commitment to seek nothing less than complete independence from Britain. The Americans signed the treaty, which recognised the United States of America as a sovereign nation for the first time. The British continued their efforts to resolve the situation with the Americans by diplomacy, but when it became clear that they weren't interested, the British declared war on France on 17th July 1778.


In preparation for the seemingly inevitable war against the French, the British began to mobilise the fleet and HMS London was taken into the Royal Dockyard at Chatham and underwent minor repairs and was prepared for sea. As part of this, the ship was fitted with her guns, masts and rigging. It was during this work that her armament was increased from 90 to 98 guns with the addition of gunports for 8 6pdr long guns on her quarterdeck. When she was eventually completed, HMS London was a ship of 1,870 tons. She was 177ft 6in long on her upper gundeck and 144ft 1in long at the keel. She was 49ft 8in wide across the beams and drew 13ft 3in of water at the bow and 17ft 6in at the rudder. HMS London was armed with 28 32pdr long guns on her lower gundeck, 30 18pdr long guns on her middle gundeck, 30 12pdr guns on her upper gundeck, 8 6pdr long guns on her quarterdeck and two nine-pounder long guns on her forecastle. Under an Admiralty Order dated July 13th 1779, second-rate ships like HMS London were also to be fitted with four 12pdr carronades on the forecastle and six more on the quarterdeck, but it's not clear whether or not these were fitted to HMS London. The ship also carried a dozen half-pounder swivel-guns on her quarterdeck and forecastle handrails and in her fighting tops. The ship was to be manned by a crew of 750 officers, men, boys and Royal Marines.


On 14th February 1779, the repairs and preparations for sea were completed at a cost of £15,262.18s.5d. The ship commissioned into the Channel Fleet under Captain Samuel Pitchford Cornish and was assigned to be flagship of Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Graves. In September 1779, Captain Cornish was appointed to command the 74 gun ship HMS Invincible and his place in HMS London was taken by Captain David Graves. During January of 1780, the ship was taken into the Royal Dockyard at Plymouth and was coppered. On 17th May 1780, HMS London sailed for the North America Station to reinforce the squadron under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir John Byron. Under Rear-Admiral Graves' command was the squadron which in addition to HMS London comprised the 74 gun ships HMS Culodden, HMS Royal Oak, HMS Bedford and HMS Resolution, the 64 gun ships HMS Prudent and HMS America and the 24 gun post-ship HMS Amphitrite. There, she joined the force under the Commander-in-Chief North America Station, Vice-Admiral Sir Mariot Arbuthnot.


Arbuthnot was a product of the corruption and maladministration rampant in the Royal Navy at the time. He had advanced to his position by seniority alone, had no idea of naval tactics and was widely regarded as being a foul-mouthed bully. He had already fallen out with Vice-Admiral Sir George Rodney, Commander-in-Chief in the Caribbean.


In December 1780, Brigadier-General Benedict Arnold was operating in Virginia under orders from the army Commander-in-Chief General Clinton to conduct raiding operations and to enter and fortify Portsmouth in modern-day New Hampshire with about 1,700 troops. The American commander General George Washington sent the French general the Marquis de Lafayette. Washington was hoping to be able to trap Arnold's force between Lafayette's force and a naval detachment commanded by the French admiral Charles Rene Dominique Sochet, the Chevalier Destouches. This was a mission which the French admiral was reluctant to accept; he was acutely aware of the bigger British force. In early February 1781, Arbuthnot's fleet had been hit by a storm which had damaged some of his ships and this prompted Destouches to send a small squadron of three ships of the line which succeeded in capturing the British 44 gun two-decker HMS Romulus before they headed back to their base at Newport, Rhode Island. This success together with pressure from Washington pursuaded Destouches to send a full-scale force to the Chesapeake Bay. Arbuthnot learned about the French departure on 10th March and set off in pursuit and reached Cape Henry at the entrance to Chesapeake Bay just ahead of the French. At 6am on 16th March, the two fleets spotted each other and formed lines of battle. The two fleets manoeuvred for advantage until about 13:00 when Destouches steered his line of battle across the path of the advancing British. This meant that he could engage the British from downwind, technically a disadvantage but in reality it meant that in the rough weather, his ships could open their lower gundeck gunports, something the British were unable to do for fear of sinking their ships. Arbuthnot attempted to counter this by turning his fleet to follow the French but it had the effect of exposing his ships to the full force of the French broadsides. The British were taking severe damage, but Destouches pulled his fleet off to the east before he had been able to fully exploit his advantage. Arbuthnot entered Chesapeake Bay and prevented Destouches from achieving his objective. The French returned to Newport, while Arbuthnot returned to New York.


In the Battle of Cape Henry, HMS London suffered no serious damage or sustained any casualties, though that was the exception rather than the rule. In July 1781, realising he was out of his depth, Arbuthnot cited his advancing age and infirmity and resigned and returned to the UK. The Battle of Cape Henry taught the French a valuable lesson. If you control the mouth of Chesapeake Bay, it is impossible for the enemy to dislodge you. This was to have catastrophic consequences for the British war effort later in the year. With Arbuthnot's resignation, Rear-Admiral Graves assumed command of the North America Station.


The tracks of the fleets at the Battle of Cape Henry, 16th March 1781:





During the early months of 1781, a British army under the command of General Charles, the Lord Cornwallis, had been successfully campaigning in Virginia, driving the rebels, led by General George Washington and their French allies, led by General the Compte de Rochambeau, south. Considering that the main British bases were in Philadelpia and New York, this had left Cornwallis' supply lines too stretched, so he had received orders from the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Henry Clinton, to establish a deep water port on the Virginia coast. Following his orders, Cornwallis moved into the town of Yorktown, at the head of Chesapeake Bay and his soldiers began to fortify the town. Both sides in the war realised that with the British fortifying Yorktown, control of Chesapeake Bay was vital. The British were aware by now that the Compte de Grasse, France's finest naval commander, was loose in the area with a fleet and were concerned that he would try to secure the entrance to Chesapeake Bay. Sir Samuel Hood was detached with a squadron of 14 ships of the line to search for de Grasse. Hood arrived at Chesapeake Bay on 25th August 1781 and found nothing there, so decided to sail on to New York. On arrival at New York, he found Graves and the rest of the fleet there having failed to intercept a large convoy known to be bound for America from France full of supplies and hard currency for the rebels.


On 27th August, a French fleet comprising of 8 ships of the line, 4 frigates and 18 transport ships carrying seige equipment, troops and heavy field guns left Newport bound for the Chesapeake Bay. News of this reached Graves in New York on 31st and he immediately sailed to intercept the French force. Graves had correctly guessed that the French were on their way to Chesapeake Bay. The two fleets sighted each other at 9.30 am on 5th September 1781. The French had got there first.


Graves realised his only chance of success was to force his way into the Bay, past the French who were coming out to meet him and destroy the transport ships unloading near Cape Henry. Due to the way the various squadrons of the British fleet had manoeuvred into position prior to the battle, the Vanguard division found itself bringing up the rear of the British fleet as the lines of battle came into contact with each other. Many of the British ships were in poor condition, not having been near a dockyard in years. In addition, Graves caused confusion in his own fleet by sending conflicting signals. The result was that as the British captains and divisional commanders attempted to follow Graves' signals, the front and centre of the British fleet was heavily engaged and suffered severe damage against the superior French force while the rear division, did not engage at all. The Battle of Chesapeake Bay itself started at about 16:00, the delay was caused by Graves' insistence on his fleet getting into their proper formation before engaging. At sunset, the fighting ceased. Neither fleet had gained an advantage, other than the fact that the French were in the Bay and controlled it, whereas the British were not. On the night of the 6th September, Graves had a conference aboard his flagship with his divisional commanders, Hood and Drake. Hood and Graves, by all accounts, had a sharp exchange of words over the issue of the conflicting signals and Hood proposed that the fleet just sail past the French, straight into the bay. Graves rejected this plan and the British fleet continued to sail aimlessly to the eastward, away from Yorktown. On 11th September, Graves ordered that HMS Terrible (74) be scuttled as she was too badly damaged to continue. On 13th September, Graves learned that the French fleet was back in Chesapeake Bay and decided to give up attempting to force his way into the bay. On 20th September, the battered British fleet arrived back in New York. Although the Battle of Chesapeake Bay was indecisive in itself, the British failure to eject the French from Chesapeake Bay was to have profound and disastrous effects on the rest of the war. Yorktown had been encircled by the Americans and their French allies. With the Royal Navy unable to resupply him from the sea, Lord Cornwallis was faced with a stark choice - starve, along with his army and the inhabitants of Yorktown or surrender. On 17th September, Cornwallis wrote to General Clinton "if you cannot relieve me very soon, you must be prepared to hear the worst".


On 19th October, Graves left New York again with a fleet of 25 ships of the line and a fleet of transports carrying 7,000 soldiers. On arrival off Chesapeake Bay, he found to his horror that he was two days too late. Cornwallis had surrendered to George Washington and the Compte de Rochambeau on the day he had left New York.


In the Battle of Chesapeake Bay, Graves commanded the fleet from the Centre Division in HMS London.


The Battle of Chesapeake Bay:





Tracks of the fleets at the Battle of Chesapeake Bay:





The surrender of Cornwallis and his army at Yorktown left the British position untenable. With insufficient troops left to defend New York and Philadelphia, they were forced to abandon those cities and the loyalist communities in them to their fate.


After the battle and the victory at Yorktown, de Grasse returned with his fleet to Martinique as he had other plans to fulfil. After the Battle of Chesapeake Bay, Captain Graves was replaced in command of HMS London by Captain James Kempthorne. HMS London remained on the North America Station as flagship with Rear-Admiral Graves as Commander-in-Chief, while the main part of the action at sea shifted to the Caribbean as the Compte de Grasse put into action his plan to expel the British from the region. This was thwarted when De Grasse and his fleet was defeated by Sir George Rodney and Sir Samuel Hood at the Battle of the Saintes on 12th April 1782 and the Battle of Mona Passage on 17th.


In August 1782, peace talks had begun in Paris and the war in American and Carribean waters had already begun to wind down. In June 1782, Rear-Admiral Graves left HMS London and transferred his command flag to the 74 gun ship of the line HMS Ramillies. His next task was to take a convoy which comprised his flagship, plus the 74 gun third rate ships of the line HMS Centaur and HMS Canada and the 12pdr armed 32 gun frigate HMS Pallas. In addition to these ships, the convoy included over 100 merchant vessels, plus the prizes taken at the Battles of the Saintes and Mona Passage, the Ville de Paris of 104 guns, L'Hector and Le Glorieux (both of 74 guns), L'Ardent, Le Jason and Le Caton (all of 64 guns). The convoy left Bluefields Bay, Jamaica bound for the UK on 27th July 1782. On 17th August the convoy was struck by a hurricane in which the Ville de Paris, HMS Ramillies, HMS Centaur, Le Glorieux and many of the merchant vessels foundered. Rear-Admiral Graves was one of the survivors of the loss of HMS Ramillies, having been picked up by a merchant vessel after they had been forced to abandon ship. With the departure of Rear-Admiral Graves, the ship became flagship to Rear-Admiral Sir Joshua Rowley.


On 18th October 1782, HMS London was off Hispaniola in company with the 74 gun third rate ship HMS Torbay. That ship had an interesting history. She had originally been launched as far back as 1683 as the 90 gun second rate ship HMS Neptune. That ship had been broken up and rebuilt no less than three times in the 100 years since her original launch. HMS Torbay was the product of the final rebuild which had seen the ship cut down from a 90 gun three-decker to a 74 gun two-decker and renamed in 1755. Such was the desperate state of unpreparedness of the Royal Navy at the start of the war that even ancient ships like HMS Torbay had been dragged back into service. The two British ships spotted sails in the distance and gave chase. The strangers turned out to be the French 74 gun ship of the line Le Scipion and the 12pdr armed 32 gun frigate La Sibylle. On seeing the British ships chasing them, the two French ships turned to the attack, with Le Scipion using her superior manoeuvrability to work her way across HMS London's stern. The French ship poured a broadside through HMS London's unprotected stern which caused severe damage to the bigger British ship. Thinking that HMS London was crippled, Captain Nicholas Henri de Grimouard of Le Scipion decided not to press home the advantage he had gained and made off. HMS London's crew quickly made running repairs to their ship and the two British ships of the line resumed the chase. Le Scipion's commander, who had been wounded in the action, decided to anchor and stand and fight in Samana Bay, but as the ship prepared to anchor, she struck a coral reef which ripped the bottom out of the ship and she sank in about 30ft of water. More information about the wreck of Le Scipion, her recent rediscovery and the exploration of the wreck is given in this website:


http://www.therealdr.com/dominican-republic-history/the-wreck-of-le-scipion-samana-bay.html


In the Action of 18th October 1782, the British force suffered casualties of 11 killed and 75 wounded.


HMS London is raked by Le Scipion during the Action of 18th October 1782 - painting by Rossel de Cercy:





On 26th April 1783, HMS London finally left Jamaica bound for home. In July 1783, the ship paid off into the Ordinary at Chatham. The Treaty of Paris was signed on 3rd September 1783, to be effective from March 1784. The war was over.


Whilst in the Ordinary at Chatham, HMS London would have been kept moored in the River Medway off the Royal Dockyard and was manned by a skeleton crew as before. The Resident Commissioner at Chatham faced a problem where the crews of ships paying off into the Ordinary simply unloaded their ships and dumped hundreds of tons of stores, guns and ammunition on the quayside and left it there in their haste to be paid off and return to their civilian lives.


In July 1785, HMS London was surveyed and found to be in need of repairs, so the ship was taken into the Royal Dockyard at Chatham and underwent a 'Middling' repair. This was completed in March 1787 and the ship went back to her mooring in the River Medway. The repairs cost a total of £36,631.12s.11d.


In July 1789, the French Revolution occurred. In this, the absolute power of the French monarchy was replaced by a constitutional monarchy not unlike our own. At the time, the British government was quite relaxed about the Revolution. Their view was that with the power of the French king limited by an elected assembly, the risk of disputes escalating into war was much reduced. Sadly, things didn't turn out as hoped in France. The King was reluctant to hand over power and a struggle for control of the country developed which brought parts of the country into open civil war. This led to the rise of the republican Jacobin movement. Alarmed at the rise of the Jacobins and fearing for the security of the British monarchy, the British began to support French royalists with money and arms. In the meantime, during 1790, Britain and Spain became involved in a territorial dispute in what is now western Canada. The British established a trading settlement at Nootka on what is now Vancouver Island in defiance of a Spanish territorial claim over the entire western coastline of both American continents. Both sides began to prepare for war and the British began to mobilise the fleet. As part of this, HMS London was moved back into the Royal Dockyard to be prepared for sea and was commissioned in June 1790 under Captain Sir William Dommett. As part of these preparations, HMS London was fitted with 12pdr long guns on her forecastle and quarterdeck in place of the smaller guns fitted previously.


HMS London commissioned into the Channel Fleet, then assembling at the great fleet anchorage at Spithead. Captain Dommett remained in command until October 1790, when he was replaced in command by Captain George Blagden Westcott.


It was during this period that HMS London, or rather her Midshipmen, became involved in a sequence of events known as the Midshipmens Mutiny, which is little known now and was actively played down by the Establishment and the press at the time, but which was a portent of things to come. On 16th August 1791, Mr Midshipman Edward Moore of HMS London was tried before a Court Martial on charges of sedition and forming a mutinous combination amongst the 'young gentlemen' of the Channel Fleet. This had all started the previous June when a Midshipman of the 74 gun ship of the line HMS Saturn, Mr Thomas Leonard, had been ordered by the ship's First Lieutenant, Mr William Shield, to go to the head of the main mast and not to come down until invited to do so. 'Mastheading' was a common punishment for Midshipmen who had committed some minor offence. In the case of Mr Leonard, he had failed to report  the firing of the evening gun to Mr Shield. On being ordered to go to the masthead, Mr Leonard had refused, asserting that the punishment was beneath the dignity of an officer and a gentleman. Mr Shield was enraged by this and ordered that a tackle be rigged in order to haul the protesting Midshipman up to the mast head. On the way up, Mr Leonard had hit the main top and had been injured. This didn't stop him untying himself once he had reached the head of the main mast and making his way back to the deck. Mr Shield ordered him to return to the masthead at once but Mr Leonard again refused, this time stating that his injury prevented him from making the 180ft climb to the mainmast crosstrees. At this point, the ships surgeon was asked to intervene and he confirmed that Mr Leonards injuries were such that the punishment should be discontinued. Mr Leonard then reported Mr Shield for excessive brutality and the Lieutenant eventually faced a Court Martial which had acquitted him. The story spread through the assembled fleet like wildfire. On 3rd July, Mr Moore had paid a visit to his old shipmates aboard HMS Edgar (74) and dined with them in their quarters in the cockpit, on the orlop level. Bad weather prevented his return to HMS London until after dinner the following day. Whilst aboard HMS Edgar, the subject of conversation must have turned to the issue of Mr Leonard and a group of unnamed midshipmen agreed a plan that they would rally the Midshipmen and Masters Mates of the fleet in support of Mr Leonard and urge them to write letters of support to Mr Leonard, encouraging him to proceed with his prosecution of Mr Shield. The letters read as follows:


Dear Gentlemen,


The Gentlemen of the ship have unanimously written to Mr Leonard the Midshipman who has been lately treated with such a wanton stretch of arbitrary power, on board the Saturn, highly commending him for his spirited behavior on the Occasion, and recommending him to prosecute it to the utmost, as the dignity of the Corps from which every future naval commander must rise, depends on it.


Feeling the insult offered to us by his treatment we take the Liberty, Gentlemen, of submitting our sentiments on the Subject to you. We think and hope it will meet your approbation, that if all the gentlemen of the different ships, were to write to him, and encourage him to prosecute the matter to the utmost, it might answer a good purpose, for it appears, at least to us, that the honour of the Navy is deeply concerned.


Signed


The Young Gentlemen of the Edgar



Mr Moore brought a copy of the letter back to HMS London with him and it was read in the Midshipmans Berth and attracted a lot of support. Copies of the letter were sent to at least eight of the ships assembled at Spithead and in some cases, including that of HMS London, the captain became aware of it.


The Court Martial became centred on the issue of the status of a Midshipman's gentlemanly honour. It also highlighted confusion amongst the Midshipmen over which took precedence, their social status or their rank within the Royal Navy. Many of the Midshipmen came from the landed gentry and the nobility and since Prince William Henry Clarence (the third son of King George III and eventual King William IV) had joined the Royal Navy and had thus far had a successful career, a precedent had been set where rich and powerful families sent their eldest sons to sea. Many of them therefore, felt that their social status was something of extreme importance. The Royal Navy's view was that their social status was irrelevant since they wouldn't be regarded as being an officer and a gentleman until they passed their examination for Lieutenant. In the peacetime Navy, opportunities for advancement were few and far between unless you had the interest of a senior officer behind you. Mr Moore conducted his own defence and was able to present glowing references from numerous distinguished senior officers. In addition, many of the Midshipmen of HMS Edgar who had been present when the letter had been drawn up simply refused to answer questions about it. In the end, the Court Martial panel decided that the case against Mr Moore had only been proved in part; that he was not guilty of Mutiny but was guilty of Contempt of Court. He was sentenced spend a month in the Marshalsea Prison and to receive a formal reprimand. In fact, he never went to the Marshalsea Prison and the two weeks he did serve were served in the guardship. Captain Westcott was one of those who gave evidence. Westcott later went on to command one of HMS London's sister-ships, HMS Impregnable, at the Battle of the Glorious First of June in 1794 and was killed in action commanding HMS Majestic at the Battle of the Nile.


What is now called the Spanish Armaments Crisis was resolved peacefully after the French refused to provide the Spanish with guarantees of assistance should war with the British break out. Almost as soon as the Spanish Armaments Crisis was resolved, another crisis loomed with the Russians over the Russian annexation of the Crimea. Political support for an armed intervention in the war between the Russians and the Ottoman Empire evaporated during 1791, so this crisis also passed off peacefully and HMS London was once again paid off into the Chatham Ordinary.


In December 1792, amidst increasing violence in France, the Jacobins abolished the French Monarchy and put the King and Queen on trial for treason. Convicted, they were executed in Paris in January 1793. In protest, the British expelled the French Ambassador and on 1st February 1793, France declared war.


In May 1793, HMS London was taken into the Royal Dockyard at Chatham and was prepared for sea, commissioning into the Channel Fleet under Captain Richard Goodwin Keats. The ship was supposed to have been assigned as flagship to Captain Keats' friend and patron, ear-Admiral the Prince William Henry, Duke of Clarence. His appointment however was cancelled after he made a speech in the House of Lords opposing the war, which put the Admiralty in a difficult position politically. The prince was not allowed to take up his appointment, with the Admiralty citing his royal status and fears for his safety against fervently republican French forces. For the time being at least, HMS London was to operate as a private ship pending the settlement of the row over her intended flag-officer.


The Channel Fleet assembled at the anchorage off St Helens, Isle of Wight under the command of the highly respected veteran commander Admiral Richard, the Lord Howe, in order to begin the implementation of the blockade of the French Channel and Biscay ports. On 14th July, the fleet left the anchorage for exercises in the Western Approaches. At about 16:00 on 18th July 1973, about 60 miles west of the Isles of Scilly while manoeuvring in a squall, HMS Majestic (74) collided with HMS Bellerophon (74). As a result of the collision, HMS Bellerophon lost the head of her bowsprit. With the support provided by the bowsprit and the standing rigging attached to it gone, in the high winds, the entire foremast fell backwards, taking the maintopmast with it. HMS Bellerophon was left in a total mess and was completely crippled. Lord Howe ordered that HMS Ramillies (74) tow the damaged ship back to Plymouth for repairs and the pair left the fleet immediately, with HMS Ramillies returning to the fleet on the 20th. Two days later, HMS London joined the fleet having been sent to replace HMS Bellerophon and on the 23rd, the fleet came to anchor in Torbay.


On 25th, Lord Howe received intelligence from an American merchantman who claimed to have sailed through a French fleet believed to be comprised of 17 ships of the line, about 30 miles west of Belle-Isle. Lord Howe immediately ordered the fleet to sea again and later that day, the fleet fell in with the 24 gun sixth rate post-ship HMS Eurydice, whose commander, Captain Francis Cole reported that he had received similar intelligence from a British privateer and that the French had stationed themselves off Belle-Isle in order to protect a convoy from the Caribbean which was expected at any time. Lord Howe then ordered his fleet to head for Belle-Isle, which they reached on 31st. Later that day, the ships of the line including HMS London were ordered by Lord Howe to form a line of battle and to stand in towards the island. On 1st August, the French were again sighted and the British changed course to close the range, so that by noon, the enemy were so close that their hulls could be seen from the decks of the British ships. In the early afternoon, the wind died away to a dead calm. In the evening, a light breeze sprang up, which the British exploited to head directly at the enemy, but the coming of nightfall prevented the fleets from getting to grips with each other. Dawn on the 2nd August came and the French were nowhere to be seen. Over the next few days, the weather deteriorated significantly, to the point where Lord Howe and the fleet was forced to return to the shelter of Torbay.


On 23rd August, the Channel Fleet again left Torbay, this time to escort the Newfoundland-bound convoy past any danger presented by the French and to await the arrival of the convoy from the West Indies. Having achieved both objectives and having spent another ten or twelve days on manoeuvres around the Isles of Scilly, the Channel Fleet again anchored in Torbay on 4th September 1793. They left Torbay again on 27th October, this time to cruise in the Bay of Biscay, looking for a fight with the French. At 09:00 on 18th November, the 18pdr armed 38 gun frigate HMS Latona sighted a strange squadron upwind of her, which proved to be five French ships of the line, two frigates, a brig-corvette and a schooner. The French force continued to close with Lord Howe's fleet until, once more, they were clearly visible from the decks of the British ships. It would appear that the French squadron had mistaken the full force of the British Channel Fleet for a merchant convoy and had closed to intercept. On realising the full horror of their mistake, they very quickly turned tail and fled the scene. Lord Howe ordered his leading ships of the line, HMS Russell, HMS Bellerophon (which by now had completed her repairs and rejoined the fleet), HMS Defence, HMS Audacious and HMS Ganges (all of 74 guns), plus the frigates, to set all sail and chase the enemy. In gale-force winds and high seas, the British ships strained every inch of rigging in their determination to catch the enemy force and bring them to action, but very soon, the strain began to tell. HMS Russel sprang her fore-topmast and at 11:00, the fore and main-topmasts on HMS Defence collapsed and crashed down to the deck. Seeing that his ships of the line were struggling in the bad weather, Lord Howe changed his mind and instead ordered his frigates to continue the chase and keep the enemy in sight and lead the fleet. At a little after noon, the wind shifted a little and allowed the leading British frigate, HMS Latona, to close the range and engage the two rear-most French frigates. By 4pm, HMS Latona was in a position to be able to cut off one of the enemy frigates and take her, but the French commander, Commodore Vanstabel in the Tigre of 74 guns bore down and stopped it. The Tigre and another French 74 gun ship passed close enough to HMS Latona to be able to fire full broadsides at the British frigate. Captain Edward Thornborough of HMS Latona was having none of this and luffed up (that is, steered his ship directly into the wind, stopping the ship dead in the water) and returned the French fire, cutting away the fore stay and main tack line of the Tigre as well as damaging her in her hull. None of the other British ships were able to get near and more ships suffered damage to their masts and rigging in the severe weather. HMS Vanguard (74) and HMS Montagu (74) both lost their main-topmasts. This convinced Lord Howe to call off the chase. After this skirmish, Lord Howe kept his fleet at sea until mid-December, when the Channel Fleet returned to Spithead.


In February 1794, it became clear that the Admiralty was not going to budge from it's position over the status of Prince William Henry, so Captain Keats received orders to take the ship home and pay her off. He was appointed to command the 18pdr armed 32 gun frigate HMS Galatea and ordered to join the Falmouth frigate squadron, then under the command of Commodore Sir William Sidney Smith, engaged in commerce raiding duties in the Bay of Biscay. HMS London paid off into the Ordinary. She wasn't to remain there long. HMS London was a large and powerful ship of the the line and was desperately needed to maintain the blockade of French Atlantic and Channel ports so six months after she paid off, she recommissioned under Captain Lawrence William Halstead as flagship to Rear-Admiral Sir John Colpoys. Colpoys had been ordered to command the Inshore Squadron squadron of the Channel Fleet enforcing the blockade of Brest. In addition to his flagship, Colpoys also had under his command the 74 gun ships HMS Colossus, HMS Hannibal, HMS Robust and HMS Valiant, and the frigates HMS Astrea (12pdr 32) and HMS Thalia (18pdr 36).


In April 1794, Sir John Colpoys was promoted to Vice-Admiral but remained in HMS London in command of the Inshore Squadron.


In February 1795, Captain Halstead was appointed to command the 12pdr armed 36 gun frigate HMS Venus and his place in command of HMS London was taken by the Vice-Admiral's nephew, Captain Edward Griffiths.


On 10th April 1795, the squadron was going about it's business off Brest when they sighted three sails in the distance. Colpoys immediately ordered the squadron to give chase. The three strangers were identified as being the French 12pdr 36 gun frigates Gloire, Fraternite and Gentille. This small squadron had been on a commerce-raiding sortie in the Bay of Biscay and were returning to Brest when they had been sighted by the British squadron. With the wind in their favour, the British squadron quickly caught up with the French frigates. HMS Colossus got close enough to exchange fire with the French before teh French commander ordered his squadron to split up. Gentille and Fraternite headed out into the Atlantic pursued by the fastest of the British ships of the line, HMS Hannibal and HMS Robust while Gloire headed north-west, pursued by the rest of the squadron. Of the rest of the British sqadon, only HMS Astrea managed to remain in contact with the fleeing French frigate and at 22:30, Captain Lord Henry Paulet managed to get his frigate alongside the larger French ship and began a firefight with La Gloire which continued for the next hour or so until the rest of the British squadron came into sight and the French captain decided to surrender in the face of overwhelming British force. Once the prize had been secured, Colpoys ordered the squadron to go to Portsmouth to refit and resupply. On arriving at Portsmouth, Colpoys learned from Captain Edward Thornborough of HMS Robust that HMS Hannibal had captured the Gentille while the Fraternite had escaped. By all accounts, the captain of the Gentille had surrendered without a fight rather than face a one-sided fight against the British seventy-four. The French captain had apparently been astonished that his frigate had been overhauled and outsailed by HMS Hannibal in open water. When Captain John Markham of HMS Hannibal was asked about this, he merely responded that "The Hannibal sails like a witch".


The Prize money from the two French frigates captured during the Action of 10th April 1795 was distributed amongst the crews of the squadron.


By June 1795, command of the Channel Fleet had passed to Sir Alexander Hood, the Lord Bridport. On 12th June, Lord Bridport, flying his command flag in the 100 gun first rate ship HMS Royal George, led the Channel Fleet including Vice-Admiral Colpoys' squadron out of Spithead to escort a convoy of troopships intended to land a French Royalist army at Quiberon Bay in order to launch a counter-revolution in France. What Bridport didn't know was that a British squadron of 5 ships of the line under Vice-Admiral The Honourable Sir William Cornwallis had encountered a French squadron of three ships of the line with a convoy and after seizing the convoy, had forced the enemy warships to seek shelter under the guns of the highly fortified French island of Belle Isle back in May. Cornwallis had withdrawn to escort his prizes back to UK waters before returning with the intention of destroying the French squadron. In the meantime, the French Atlantic Fleet had learned of the situation of their collegues and had sailed in full force to rescue them. When Cornwallis returned, he had encountered the full force of the French fleet and had been forced to beat a hasty retreat. After abandoning the pursuit of Cornwallis' squadron, the French had sought shelter from deteriorating weather in the anchorage at Belle Isle. In the meantime, Bridport sent the troopships ahead under the command of Commodore John Borlase Warren while he stood his fleet offshore, anticipating the arrival of the French attempting to prevent the landings. One of Warren's frigates, HMS Arethusa (18pdr 38) spotted the French as they were departing Belle Isle on their way back to Brest. On 20th June, Warren's force again met up with the Fleet and informed Viscount Bridport of their discovery. Bridport immediately manoeuvred the fleet to stand between Warren's landing force and the French Fleet. At 03:30 on 22nd June, lookouts on HMS Nymphe (12pdr 36) spotted the French. On spotting the British, the French turned back towards the land. On seeing that the French did not intend to fight, Viscount Bridport ordered his fastest ships to give chase, so at 06:30, HMS Sans Pareil (80), HMS Orion (74), HMS Valiant (74), HMS Colossus (74), HMS Irresistible (74) and HMS Russell (74) broke formation to start the chase. The rest of the Channel Fleet followed as fast as they could. The chase continued all day, with the British very slowly gaining on the French. At 12:00, the two fleets were about 12 miles apart. Lord Bridport ordered his ships to adopt a formation so that they could intercept the French regardless of where they turned. At 19:00, Lord Bridport ordered his leading ships to attack the rear-most French ships and at 19:25, to attack the French as and when they overhauled them. At 22:30, the wind died away, causing both fleets to come to a stop, but by 03:00 the following morning, it had risen again from the south-west. This was enough for the British to push ahead so that by dawn, the French fleet was dead ahead. They were in a loose cluster of ships, with two or three stragglers and with one ship, the Alexandre (74), formerly HMS Alexander, trailing about three miles astern of the rest. In a suprising turn of events, Captain Sir Andrew Snape Douglas in HMS Queen Charlotte had managed to catch up with the leading ships with his massive 100 gun first rate ship.


At about 05:00, the French commander, Villaret Joyeuse, became concerned that the Alexandre would be isolated and taken by the British, so he sent the frigate Regeneree to tow her out of trouble. He hadn't reckoned on Captain Douglas' exceptionally skilled handling of his massive ship and at about 06:00, HMS Queen Charlotte was able to drive off the Regeneree and engage the Alexandre and with the support of Captain Sir James Saumarez in HMS Orion (74), both ships quickly reduced the Alexandre to a shattered ruin. At 06:15, HMS Queen Charlotte moved on to the next ship in the French line, the Formidable of 74 guns. The Formidable put up a fierce resistance to the British first rate ship's overwhelming firepower for about 15 minutes until a fire broke out on the Frenchman's poop deck. While the French crew were dealing with this, HMS Sans Pareil moved up and poured a broadside into the already broken French two-decker. While HMS Queen Charlotte and HMS Sans Pareil were dealing with the Formidable, HMS London, HMS Queen (98), HMS Colossus and HMS Russell (74) pushed into the centre of the French fleet and got stuck in. By this time, HMS Queen Charlotte had suffered severe damage to her rigging and had become unmanageable. At 07:14, HMS Queen Charlotte drifted past the Alexandre and let her have another broadside. The French ship had had enough and struck her colours in surrender. Even as his ship drifted out of control, Captain Douglas ordered his ship to engage the French seventy-fours Peuple and Tigre at long range. They were joined in this by HMS Sans Pareil, which forced the Tigre out of the French formation and isolated her. At this point, HMS London and HMS Queen joined in the attack. Faced with such overwhelming odds, the Tigre surrendered. By 08:00, the British fleet flagship HMS Royal George (100) had reached the scene of the action and had been joined by HMS Queen Charlotte, whose crew had managed to make sufficient repairs to be able to bring their ship under control. HMS Royal George let the Peuple have a broadside before Lord Bridport realised that the French commander was attempting to lure him close to the island of Groix, with it's rocks and fast currents. Concerned for the safety of his ships, Lord Bridport ordered that the Alexandre, Formidable and Tigre be taken in tow by the as-yet unengaged HMS Prince (98), HMS Barfleur (98) and HMS Prince George (98) while the rest of the fleet should discontinue the action and withdraw. Lord Bridport ordered that the captured French ships be sent back to the UK with prize crews while he remained in the area with the fleet should the French attempt to disrupt the landings in Quiberon Bay. The Quiberon Bay operation ended in disaster and on 20th September, Lord Bridport returned to the UK in HMS Royal George leaving Rear-Admiral Henry Harvey in command of the blockading fleet. In the Battle of Ile Groix, HMS London was one of the most heavily engaged British ships and suffered casualties of three men wounded. Of the French prizes, the Alexandre was taken back into the Royal Navy under her original name of HMS Alexander, Formidable was taken into the Royal Navy and renamed HMS Belle Isle and the Tigre was taken into the Royal Navy under her French name. After the battle, Lord Bridport was criticised by some for not exploiting his advantage and utterly annihilating the French Atlantic Fleet. The Admiralty however, believed he made the right decision and stood by their man. Lord Bridport was to remain in command of the Channel Fleet until 1800.


The Battle of Groix, 22nd/23rd June 1795:





After their tactical defeat and catastrophic losses at the hands of the Channel Fleet at the Battle of the Glorious First of June in 1794, the French Atlantic Fleet was reluctant to put to sea in any numbers. By 1796 however, the British had become aware that a major operation was in the offing. They had no idea what the target was though and in order to prevent being caught with his pants down, Admiral Lord Bridport split the fleet into three large squadrons, one of which was to patrol off Brest. At the time, Vice-Admiral Colpoys was busy ashore, so Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Thompson hoisted his command flag in HMS London and took the squadron to it's station. On 29th October, Colpoys rejoined the squadron and re-embarked in HMS London having arrived in the 12pdr armed 32 gun frigate HMS Niger. HMS Niger was to return to the UK with Vice-Admiral Thompson, leaving Colpoys with ten ships of the line including his flagship.


By the beginning of 1797, disaffection with their lot had spread amongst the sailors of the Channel Fleet and during routine movements of men between ships, plans had been laid to do something about it. A petition was raised and was sent to Lord Howe, whom the men greatly trusted and respected. Howe, in turn, asked Rear-Admiral Lord Seymour to investigate whether or not the men were really that unhappy and Seymour reported back that this was not the case. Howe came to regard the petition as being the work of troublemakers and decided to ignore it, but sent a copy of it to Lord Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty anyway. The men, on receiving no response from Lord Howe decided to put their plan into action and the men of HMS Royal George were to begin what became known as the Great Mutiny at Spithead. On 15th April, Lord Bridport gave the order for the Channel Fleet to put to sea. Instead of weighing the anchors, the men of HMS Royal George (100) ran into the rigging and gave three cheers. This was the signal for the mutiny to begin and as one, the men of every ship of the Channel Fleet in the anchorage off St Helens, Isle of Wight, refused to weigh anchor as ordered. The captains and officers of the Channel Fleet were astonished at this unified act of disobedience and regardless of what was threatened, the men stood firm. On 16th April, the ships companies of the fleet each elected two delegates and agreed that meetings should take place in the Admirals quarters on HMS Queen Charlotte. The following day, all the men of the fleet were sworn to support the cause and ropes were hung from the yards of the ships as a signal that the men meant business. Officers regarded as being overly oppressive were ordered ashore. On the same day, two petitions were drawn up, one for the Admiralty and one for Parliament. The petitions contained the men's demands, which were:


1) that the 'pursers pound' (14 ounces instead of 16) be abolished and that their provisions be increased to the full 16 ounce pound.
2) that their wages be increased (up to this point, the sailors of the Royal Navy had not had a pay rise for over a century)
3) that vegetables instead of flour be served with beef
4) that the sick be better attended to and that their necessities not be embezzled
5) that the men, on returning from sea, be given a short period of shore leave to visit their families.
6) that certain named officers be withdrawn from sea service on account of their cruelty and/or incompetence.
7) that an Act of Indemnity be passed by the Parliament
8) that they would not weigh anchor unless either the French were directly threatening the UK or until their demands were met.


The Great Mutiny is so-called because the sailors refused to obey orders to put to sea. The ringleaders of the Mutiny were clearly intelligent men with an eye on the public perception of their acts. They decided that only the Channel Fleet's ships of the line would be affected. Frigates and smaller vessels were still needed to escort convoys past the dangers presented by French naval units and privateers, so their crews continued with their duties as normal. In addition, the mutineers announced that although they were refusing to put to sea, they would return to duty if the French appeared off the coast. All other aspects of naval discipline were maintained. 'Mutiny' is defined as a deliberate refusal to obey orders and in that sense, the Great Mutiny meets the narrowest definition of the word. In it's effects however, the Great Mutiny was actually more akin to a strike over pay and conditions. The mutineers were what would today be called 'media savvy' in that they did not give the Government anything which could be used to turn public opinion against them.


At the time all this was going on, HMS London was moored in the anchorage at Spithead along with a number of other ships. The Mutiny at this point had not yet spread to those ships. The delegates of the fleet at St Helens, keen that the ships off Spithead should join the Mutiny, sent boats to those ships with a view to pursuading the men to join. Colpoys gave orders to the effect that the ships Royal Marines were to deny the occupants of these boats permission to come aboard HMS London. His view was that the delegates should wait until the outcome of the negotiations between the Admiralty and the fleet's delegates. The crew of HMS London however, were attempting to encourage the delegates to come aboard. On 7th May, Vice-Admiral Colpoys called the men on deck and asked the assembled crew if they had any additional grievances. They replied that they didn't, so they were ordered below. Colpoys was beginning to panic under this kind of pressure and he ordered that the officers and Marines should arm themselves. The men saw the delegates boats approaching the nearby 74 gun ship HMS Marlborough and suspecting that Colpoys was going to order the Marines to fire on any boats approaching HMS London, the men unlashed some of the middle gundeck 18pdrs and pointed them aft towards the wardroom and up through the hatchways. On seeing this, Colpoys panicked and ordered the officers and Marines to fire on any of the seamen attempting to come on deck. The situation escalated dramatically when the men actually did try to come on deck and shots were fired. Five men were killed including one of the ships two delegates and six others wounded before the Marines laid down their arms and Colpoys ordered the officers to cease firing. The men seized the First Lieutenant, Mr Peter Turner Bover, the one actually appearing to give the orders and rigged a halter from the fore-yard with every intention of hanging the lieutenant there and then. At this point, Sir John Colpoys intervened and admitted to the men that Mr Bover was only following his orders. By this point, delegates from the fleet had come aboard and realising that the situation was about to turn into a bloodbath, intervened and pursuaded the men to allow the Vice-Admiral and officers to return to their quarters and stay there. The last thing they needed was a dead Vice-Admiral on their hands. On 11th May, the crew ordered Vice-Admiral Colpoys and Captain Griffith ashore and they were accompanied by the ship's Chaplain, the Reverend Samuel Cole.


Lord Howe had in the meantime come out of retirement and was acting as the intermediary between the delegates, the Admiralty and the Government. He was hugely respected by all sides and had been going backward and forward between Portsmouth and London as the negotiations progressed. On 14th May Lord Howe returned from London bringing with him the requested Act of Parliament and having been granted the authority to settle the dispute. In addition, he brought with him a Royal Proclamation of a pardon for all involved in the Mutiny. The Act of Parliament basically granted all the men's requests. At 10:00 on 16th May, the Great Mutiny at Spithead finally ended when the ships of the Channel Fleet at Spithead put to sea.


His service aboard HMS London was to be Sir John Colpoys' last sea-going appointment. His health had been failing and he had asked the Admiralty to remove him from active service before the Great Mutiny broke out. The crew of HMS London had demanded that Colpoys be removed from the ship as a result of his actions during the dispute and although this may have been a factor behind his removal from active service later in 1797, the fact remains that he had asked for it anyway. In 1801, Sir John Colpoys was promoted to Admiral. By now he had recovered his health and was in the running to be appointed Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, to succeed Vice-Admiral Sir Horatio, the Lord Nelson, once his term in the role had finished. After the death of Lord Nelson at the Battle of Trafalgar, the Admiralty felt the job should go to Vice-Admiral Sir Cuthbert Collingwood, the Lord Collingwood instead. In 1816, Colpoys became Governor of the Greenwich Hospital and remained in that post until his death in 1821 at the age of 79. He is buried in the grounds of Greenwich Hospital, now of course, the site of the National Maritime Museum.




In December 1797, Captain Griffiths left HMS London and was replaced in command by Captain John Child Purvis and the ship spent the next two years on the Lisbon Station before she returned to Portsmouth in November 1799 to begin a refit. This was completed in January 1800 having cost £12,260. The ship recommissioned under Captain George Westcott, who had commanded the ship earlier in her career. She joined a squadron under the orders of Rear-Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren tasked with capturing the important Spanish naval base at Ferrol. The list of commanders in the ships involved in the expedition was a veritable who's-who of the top captains in the Royal Navy at the time. In addition to HMS London, Warren had under his command the 74 gun ships HMS Renown under Captain Thomas Eyles, HMS Impetueux under Captain Sir Edward Pellew, HMS Courageux under Captain Samuel Hood, HMS Captain under Captain Richard Strachan. In addition to the ships of the line were the 24pdr armed 44 gun razee frigate HMS Indefatigable, the 18pdr armed 38 gun frigate HMS Amelia, the 18pdr armed 36 gun frigate HMS Amethyst, the 18pdr armed 32 gun frigate HMS Stag, the 9pdr armed 28 gun frigate HMS Brilliant, the 6pdr armed 18 gun ship-sloop HMS Cynthia and the hired armed cutter Saint Vincent of 14 guns. The plan was to capture the naval base together with all the ships in it.


On 25th August, the force arrived in the bay of Playa de Dominos along with transport ships carrying troops under Lieutenant-General Sir James Pulteney. After the fort overlooking the bay had been silenced by gunfire from HMS Impetueux, HMS Cynthia, HMS Brilliant and the Saint Vincent, the troops, along with sixteen field guns were landed. Attacked on the beach by Spanish troops, the troops with the assistance of sailors from the ships in the fleet, drove off their attackers. The following day, the British forced their way to the heights overlooking the city and harbour. On gaining the heights, Pulteney decided that the port was too strongly defended and decided to withdraw back to the ships.


After the withdrawal from Ferrol, Warren's squadron in company with the transport ships was making its way along the Spanish coast when a large French privateer was seen to run into Vigo and anchor at a spot near the Narrows at Redondela. The captain of HMS Courageux, Sir Samuel Hood put a suggestion to the Rear-Admiral that the vessel could be taken in a cutting out raid. Warren agreed and an audacious plan was drawn up in which the men of HMS London were to participate. The letters of the officers commanding the mission tell the story:


Letter from Sir John Jervis, the Earl St Vincent, Commander-in-Chief Channel Fleet to Evan Nepean, Secretary to the Admiralty:



"Dated on board the Royal George
Off Ushant
September 7, 1800


Sir,
I enclose letters from Rear-Admiral Sir John Warren, this moment received by the Brilliant.


I am &c


ST VINCENT"



Letter from Sir John Borlase Warren to the Earl St Vincent:


"Renown
Vigo Bay
2d September 1800


My Lord,
I beg leave to inform you that, on having ordered Captain Hood of the Courageux to lead into this bay, I received a letter from him on the same evening and immediately ordered two boats from this ship, the Impetueux, and London and refer your Lordship to a letter which accompanies this, for the account of a gallant action, performed by the boats of Captain Hood's detachment, under Lieutenant Burke's orders, whose merit on this, as well as former occasions, will I trust, induce your Lordship to recommend him to the favour of their Lords COmmissioners of the Admiralty, more especially as he has been severely wounded in the Service.
I have the honor &c &c &c


JOHN WARREN"



Letter from Captain Sir Samuel Hood to Rear-Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren


"His Majesty's Ship Courageux
Vigo bay
30th August 1800


Sir,
Percieving yesterday afternoon the French privateer in the Harbour had removed for security near the Narrows of Redondella, close to the batteries, where I thought there was a probability of her being attacked with success, I ordered two boats from each ship named in the margin
(HMS Amethyst, HMS Stag, HMS Amelia, HMS Brilliant and HMS Cynthia) with those of the Renown, Impetueux and London you sent me and four from the Courageux, commanded by Lieutenants volunteering their services, to be ready at Nine O'Clock, and placed them under the direction of Lieutenant Burke, of the Renown, whose gallant conduct has so often merited your commendation. About forty minutes past twelve they attacked her with the greatest bravery, meeting with desperate resistance, her commander having laid the hatches over to prevent her people from giving way and cheered as the boats advanced, but notwithstanding this determined opposition, she was carried in fifteen minutes.
I am sorry to add Lieutenant Burke has received a severe wound, but I hope not dangerous. Our loss has been as per enclosed list, the greater part occasioned by the desperate conduct of her commander, who was mortally wounded. Too much praise cannot be given to those deserving officers and men who so gallantly supported Lieutenant Burke, and towed her out with much coolness through the fire of the enemy's batteries. I need not, Sir, comment on the ability and courage of the commanding Lieutenant, his former services having gained your esteem, and I have no doubt the sufferings of his wound will be alleviated by that well-known attention shewn to officers who have so gallantly distinguished themselves, for which I beg leave to offer my strongest recommendation.
The privateer is a very fine ship, named La Guipe, of Bordeaux, with a flush deck, three hundred tons, pierced for twenty-two guns, carrying eighteen nine-pounders, and one hundred and sixty-one men, commanded by Citoyenne Dupan, stored and provisioned in the completest manner for four months. She had twenty-five killed and forty wounded.
I have the honor to be &c &c &c
SAMUEL HOOD


A report of the killed, wounded and missing in the boats employed in the taking of the French privateer La Guipe in Vigo Bay, in the evening of 29th August 1800:


Lieutenant Henry Burke of the Renown, Wounded
Lieutenant John Henry Holmes and Joseph Nourse of the Courageux, slightly wounded
Three seamen and one Marine, killed
Three officers, twelve seamen and five marines, wounded
One seaman, missing."



In early 1801, HMS London was reported to be structurally weak. She was, after all almost forty years old and had spent the most part of that time at sea, in all weathers without taking into consideration the battle damage she had sustained over the years. Such was the need for ships however, that a large and powerful warship like HMS London was still desperately needed by the Royal Navy, so it was decided that the ships hull and frames should be reinforced. The hull planking was doubled down to the waterline and the internal frames were stiffened with diagonal braces. The work was finished in February 1801 and HMS London recommissioned with Captain Sir William Dommett in command again.


In early 1800, a sequence of events began which was to indirectly a major action which was to involve HMS London and her crew. It was also to lead, eventually to the opening of another front in the war. In time of war, the British had always insisted on the right to stop and search neutral ships at sea for contraband and war materials. The Dutch Navy had ceased to be an effective force after the Battle of Camperdown and the Vlieter Incident. As a result of this, Britain's erstwhile ally Russia had joined together with other, neutral northern nations to try to force the British to give up this right. On 25th July 1800, a small British squadron which included the 20 gun ship-sloop HMS Arrow and the 28 gun frigate HMS Nemesis encountered the large 40 gun Danish frigate Freya, which was escorting a convoy of six vessels through the English Channel, near the Goodwin Sands. In accordance with the age-old British tradition of stopping and searching neutral vessels, Captain Thomas Baker of HMS Nemesis hailed the Freya and informed the Danes of his intention to send a boat around each vessel in turn and conduct a brief search. The Danish captain, Captain Krabbe responded to the effect that the Freya would fire on the British boat if they attempted to board any of the vessels under his protection. The British duly put their boat into the water and the Danes duly carried out their threat. In the action which followed, the Freya was forced to surrender after having suffered 2 men killed and five wounded. The Danish convoy was escorted to the Downs and anchored there. In an attempt to diffuse the situation, the Commander-in-Chief at the Downs, Vice-Admiral Skeffington Lutwidge ordered that the Danish vessels be allowed to continue flying their own colours. This incident and another similar incident in the Mediterranean had threatened to open a major rift between Britain and denmark. It was vitally important for Britain to maintain good relations with neutral denmark, since Denmark controlled the Kattegat, that narrow passage from the North Sea into the Baltic.


In order to pacify the Danes and to intimidate them in case Plan A, diplomacy, failed, the British sent Lord Whitworth, previously Ambassador to the Imperial Court in Russia and Britains leading diplomat to Copenhagen to negotiate a settlement to the growing dispute before it erupted into an armed conflict. In order to reinforce Lord Whitworth's position, the British sent a squadron comprising four ships of the line, HMS Monarch (74), HMS Polyphemus (64), HMS Veteran (64) and HMS Ardent (64), three 50 gun ships, HMS Glatton, HMS Isis and HMS Romney plus the ex-Dutch 50 gun ships HMS Waakzamheid and HMS Martin, the bomb vessels HMS Sulphur, HMS Volcano, HMS Hecla and HMS Zebra and the gun-brigs HMS Swinger, HMS Boxer, HMS Furious, HMS Griper and HMS Haughty. The force was commanded by Vice-Admiral Archibald Dickson, who flew his command flag in HMS Monarch. On 29th August and agreement was reached whereby the British would pay for repairs to the Freya and the other Danish ships, that the right of the British to stop and search neutral vessels at sea would be discussed at another time and that Danish vessels would only sail in convoy in the Mediterranean for protection against Algerine corsairs. With the signing of the agreement, Dickson returned to Yarmouth with his force. That would have been the end of the matter had the pro-British Tzarina of Russia, Catherine II, not fallen ill and died. She was succeeded by her son Paul, who was a fan of Napoleon Bonaparte and was itching to find an excuse to start a war against the British. Tzar Paul took offence at the attack on the Freya and at the presence of a British squadron in the Baltic Sea. He ordered his army and navy to be mobilised for war and ordered that all British property in his dominions be seized. About 3 weeks afterward however, he changed his mind and on 22nd Septemeber, ordered that all seized British property be returned to its owners.


In the meantime, news reached Tzar Paul that the British had refused to hand Malta back to the Knights of St John after having driven the French from the islands back in 1797. This enraged the Tzar who had been promised control of the islands by the French. On 5th November, his order to seize all British shipping in Russian ports was reinstated. In the December, the Tzar proposed a confederation of Armed Neutrality which was to comprise Russia, Sweden and Denmark. If allowed to take form, this would mean the British could potentially face an additional opponent possessing a total of over 100 ships of the line as well as the combined fleets of Spain and France. The British decided to meet this new menace in kind and a fleet began to be assembled at Yarmouth, to be led by Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker with no less an officer than Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson as his second-in-command. With Parker flying his command flag in HMS London and Nelson flying his in the 98 gun 2nd rate ship HMS St. George and accompanied by 18 ships of the line, with 4 frigates plus sloops-of-war, bomb vessels and gun-brigs, the fleet departed Yarmouth on 12th March 1801. Parker had orders to neutralise the fortifications at Copenhagen and the Danish fleet should last minute negotiations fail. Parker's plan was that Nelson would lead the attack squadron, comprising of the shallower-draughted and smaller ships of the line, while Parker held back with the bigger ships. Nelson shifted his command flag to the 74 gun ship HMS Elephant.


The Danish fleet consisted of 24 ships of the line, anchored off the fortifications of Copenhagen and Nelson and his force of 12 ships of the line were required to neutralise these before troops could be landed to assault the fortifications. In the morning of the 2nd April 1801, Nelson's force made its way slowly up the Skaw, but suffered losses when first, the 64 gun ship HMS Agamemnon, then the 74 gun ships HMS Bellona and HMS Russell ran aground. Battle was joined at 10:05 when the Danish shore batteries opened fire. For the first half an hour, the leading British ships, HMS Ardent, HMS Polyphemus, HMS Edgar (74), HMS Isis (50) and HMS Monarch bore the brunt of the fire from the Danish batteries both ashore and afloat. HMS Isis was the most severely damaged and had to be rescued by HMS Polyphemus.


View of the Battle of Copenhagen. HMS London is in the group of ships in the bottom right hand corner:





Another view of the battle, with Nelson's force engaging the moored Danish fleet:





It is a commonly believed myth that when Vice-Admiral Parker had the signal to discontinue the action hoisted, Nelson put a telescope to his blind eye and said "I really do not see the signal" and appeared to deliberately disobey his superior. The part with the telescope is not disputed, Nelson really did do that. What actually happened was that Nelson and Parker had already agreed that since HMS London would not be involved in the fighting, Parker would have a better overall view of what was going on than Nelson would. They agreed that when Parker felt that the Danes were beaten, he would signal Nelson to that effect, but as the commander of the strike force, Nelson would have the final say as to when to bring the action to a stop.


After about 11:30, the rest of Nelson's force, HMS Glatton (54), HMS Elephant, HMS Ganges (74), HMS Defiance (74) and the frigates joined in the action relieving the pressure. At 16:00, a ceasefire was negotiated. The Danes had suffered heavy losses. The Danish flagship had blown up, killing 250 men. In all, it is estimated that Danish losses were about 1800 men killed, captured or wounded. The British losses came to about 250 men. The Danish fleet had been beaten into submission and the day after the battle, the Danes surrendered.


HMS London was only a spectator to the First Battle of Copenhagen, so suffered no damage or casualties. Immediately after the Battle of Copenhagen, Captain Dommett was replaced in command by Captain Robert Waller Otway. Before he took command of the ship however, Captain Otway was sent to personally deliver Vice-Admiral Parkers dispatches to the Admiralty. The League of Armed Neutrality was dissolved when Tsar Paul was assassinated and replaced by the pro-British Tsar Alexander I.


On 25th March 1802, the Treaty of Amiens was signed, bringing an end to the French Revolutionary War. At the time, the British Government felt that the war was truly over and that Europe and the rest of the world would be at peace for the forseeable future. In April 1802, HMS London paid off into the Ordinary at Portsmouth, to be manned by a skeleton crew as before.


Sadly, the peace was not to last. It soon became clear that the new ruler of France and to all intents and purposes, the rest of Europe, was bent on reshaping the entire continent's political makeup to suit his own view. Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte was also keen to demonstrate his strength and when the British began to be alarmed at what was happening in Europe and particularly French threats about the consequences on non-compliance, the peace broke down. The Napoleonic War began when Britain declared war on France on 18th May 1803.


Between April and December 1805, HMS London was refitted at a cost of £39,998 and prepared for sea. The ship recommissioned under Captain Harry Burrard Neale and rejoined the Channel Fleet, by now under the command of Admiral the Honourable Sir William Cornwallis.


At 03:00 on 13th March 1806, HMS London was patrolling off the Canary Islands in company with a squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Warren, flying his command flag in the 80-gun two decker HMS Foudroyant. In addition to HMS London and HMS Foudroyant were the 74 gun ships HMS Ramillies and HMS Repulse and the 18pdr armed 38 gun frigate HMS Amazon. In view of her slow sailing, HMS London was stationed upwind of the other ships in the squadron and at that time, her lookouts sighted two sails a short distance away. Assuming the strangers were a convoy, HMS London altered course to investigate, signalling her intentions to the Rear-Admiral. A short while later, the strangers were identified as being the French 74 gun ship of the line Marengo and the French 40 gun frigate La Belle Poule. As soon as his ship was with in range, Captain Neale gave the order to open fire. At 05:30, HMS London drew up alongside the Marengo and the two ships began to pound each other at point blank range. At 06:00, the Marengo's captain had had enough of this and attempted to make off, closely pursued by HMS London. At 06:30, La Belle Poule passed ahead of HMS London and fired a broadside into her lee bow and received fire in return before making off. At 07:00, HMS Amazon overtook HMS London in pursuit of the Belle Poule, caught and engaged her at about 08:30. HMS London in the meantime kept up a running fight against the Marengo which continued until 10:25, when on sighting HMS Foudroyant coming up to join the fight, the Marengo struck her colours in surrender to HMS London. At about the same time, the Belle Poule surrendered to HMS Amazon.


In the Action of 13th March 1806, HMS London suffered casualties of Mr Midshipman William Rooke plus nine seamen and Marines killed with Lieutenant William Faddy, Mr Midshipman J W Watson plus 20 seamen and Marines wounded. The Marengo suffered two officers and 61 men killed, with eight officers and 74 men wounded out of a crew of 740. Although the fight might seem one sided in terms of casualties, it certainly wasn't in terms of the ships themselves. Marengo was a heavy French 74 gun ship with two gundecks, slightly heavier in fact than HMS London with three. Their crews were the same size and their broadsides were of very similar weight despite HMS London having more guns. The Marengo followed the French practice of bigger ships with bigger guns, carrying as she did French 36pdrs on her lower gundeck with French 24pdrs on her upper gundeck. Carronades didn't come into the equation either, by 1806, carronades had appeared on French ships too. The Marengo is known to have carried 4 36pdr carronades on her poop deck. The differences between the two ships and what gave HMS London the advantage was better healthcare for the men, better leadership and better training. Following the Action, the Marengo was loaned to the Transport Board and was used as a prison hulk for prisoners awaiting Transportation to Australia at Portsmouth. She was broken up at Portsmouth in 1816. The Belle Poule was taken into the Royal Navy as HMS Belle Poule where she was commissioned as an 18pdr 38 gun frigate. She was converted to a troopship in 1814 and was broken up in 1816.


The fight between HMS London and the Marengo:





In Jule 1806, Captain Harry Neale was appointed to command the 110 gun first rate ship HMS Ville de Paris and was replaced in HMS London by Captain Edward Osborne.


In the autumn of 1806, Napoleon Bonaparte had threatened to invade British ally Portugal. The Portugese had conceded to Bonaparte's demands and in retaliation, the British sent a force under Rear-Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith. Smith was flying his command flag in the gigantic British 120 gun first rate ship HMS Hibernia. His force, in addition to HMS Hibernia comprised HMS London, HMS Elizabeth (74), HMS Foudroyant (80), HMS Conqueror (74), HMS Marlborough, HMS Plantagenet (74), HMS Bedford (74) and HMS Monarch. This force was tasked with mounting a blockade of the Portugese naval base in the mouth of the river Tagus. British diplomacy finally pursuaded the Portugese to change their position. It was agreed that Portugal would come under British protection. In addition, the entire Portugese Royal Family would de-camp to Rio de Janiero, from where they would govern their extensive empire. They would take the entire Portugese navy with them and the British would run affairs in Portugal until the French threat was either defeated or receded on its own. On 29th November 1807, the Portugese Royal Family put to sea in the Princip Reale (84), Conde Henrique (74), Medusa (74), Principe de Brazil (74), Rainha de Portugal (74), Alfonso D'Albequerque (64), Don Juan de Castro (64), Martino De Freitas (64), Minerva (44), Golfino (36), Urania (32), three 20 gun brig-corvettes and a 12 gun schooner. To assist the Portugese, Rear-Admiral Smith also sent HMS London, HMS Marlborough and HMS Bedford. 


In September 1809, HMS London paid off into the Chatham Ordinary for the last time. By now, the war at sea had begun to wind down and was now largely being fought with smaller vessels. The navies of Britains enemies were exhausted. There was no longer a need for so many large ships of the line like HMS London and older ships like her were all being paid off.


During April of 1811, HMS London was broken up at Chatham.
"I did not say the French would not come, I said they will not come by sea" - Admiral Sir John Jervis, 1st Earl St Vincent.